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STATUS OF INHABITANTS OF TERRITORY AC-
QUIRED BY DISCOVERY, PURCHASE, CES-
SION, OR CONQUEST, ACCORDING TO THE
USAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.
From an early period in American history two principal
theories were entertained and insisted upon by their respective
advocates in reference to the power to acquire territory.
These theories were conflicting, and were influenced by the
opposing interpretations which the national and states rights
schools placed upon the pbwers of Congress under constitu-
tional grants. The states rights school at first denied that
the United States had power under the Constitution to ac-
quire new territory; the national school insisted that the
power existed and was necessarily inherent in the government
as an attribute of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the doubt
and denial of the extreme state rights school, Louisiana and
Florida were acquired by purchase, Texas by annexation,
and an extensive territory was acquired by treaty with Mexico.
The annexation of the Hawaiian Islands was effected by joint
resolution of Congress. The Northwestern territory, acquired
previous to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, by ces-
sion from Virginia, was regulated by "An ordinance for the
government of the territory of the United States northwest
of the River Ohio," adopted by the Old Congress, July I3,
1787. Territorial governments have from time to time been
organized out of the other territories of the United States.
The recent act of Congress organizing the territory of Hawaii
prescribes specifically what classes of the inhabitants shall be
deemed citizens of the United States.
The character and extent of the power of Congress over
the territories have been the subject of repeated and excited
discussion in and out of Congress. The National School have
insisted that, under the Constitution, Congress have absolute
and despotic power over the territories; that whatever they
have the power to do, they have the right to do, if in their
judgment it will conduce to the " general welfare." And they
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construe the power " to dispose of and make all needful regu-
lations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States," as the same in effect as the "power to
exercise legislation in all cases whatsoever."
The states rights school have held that the clause in the
Constitution about the territories relates to them only as prop-
erty, and gives no right to Congress to govern them: that
their right to government springs from their acquisition
of them by cession, and is not therefore absolute. Territory
acquired under the right to declare war and make treaties
belongs to the states as states, and Congress can only legis-
late in conformity to the principles of the Constitution. They
have the authority to maintain peace and order, and to estab-
lish tribunals for the administration -of criminal and civil jus-
tice according to the law of the land as it existed at the time
of the cession; but they can no more change the law of the
land in a territory than they can in a state. They cannot
regulate private property or interfere with private rights. In
short, the law of the ceded territory on all subjects not within
the delegated powers of Congress in the states must continue
until changed by the only legitimate authority, when the people
of such territory, with the authority of Congress, form a sov-
ereign state. To state briefly the essence of these conflicting
theories in respect of the character and extent of the consti-
tutional power of Congress, as has. just been done in the lan-
guage of an eminent American jurist, is to suggest the relative
soundness and infirmity of the respective doctrines. Mean-
while the usage in respect to the government of territories has
followed the inclination of the National School; occasionally
this course has been modified and qualified as the result of
judicial interpretation. The trend of federal decisions, how-
ever, has been in support of the doctrines of the National
School.
It is to be observed that there are two separate and distinct
subjects to be kept in mind in any discussion that aims at an
intelligent, practical conclusion; first, the territory, pure and
simple, as property; second, the inhabitants, as distinct from,
yet occupying, the territory. The law and usage which gov-
ern territory as property of the sovereign are one thing; the
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people over whose lives, liberty and property the new sov-
ereign claims to exercise dominion and government is quite
another thing; and some of the confusion which characterizes
much discussion in this regard will be avoided if this distinc-
tion is considered. As to the territory, meaning the public land
and public property, the power of the new sovereign is abso-
lute: but in respect to the inhabitants,-the people, being
freemen,--the power of the new sovereign is, to a certain ex-
tent, correspondent to that of the former sovereign, and may
be further qualified by public law, usage, treaty stipulations
and by the fundamental principles recognized and immemori-
ally proclaimed by the state of the new sovereign. "But it is
not easy to distinguish between what are political and what
are municipal laws, and to determine when and how far the
constitution and laws of the conqueror change or replace
those of the conquered."' As between the new government
and the citizen, protection and allegiance are reciprocal; but
this relation does not by any means imply that political privi-
leges and franchises are included in the recognition of the
property and personal rights of the inhabitants. Political
franchises are presumably granted on grounds of expediency,
having in view the safety of the state and the best interest of
the community. The immediate pioperty which is possessed
by individuals is therefore to be distinguished from the ulti-
mate property in the territory of the state, and the objects
of property accessory to it, which is vested in the state itself.
As a member of the family of nations, the United States
recognizes and is bound by principles of public law as its
rule of action in all matters having an international char-
acter; but when it is question of municipal administration in
matters not affecting the international relation, it looks alone
to the Constitution, its municipal law and the usage of civil-
ized states for guidance and direction.
The general usage sanctioned by treaty stipulations has been
to constitute the inhabitants of acquired territory citizens of
the United States under conditions and with exceptions spe-
cially indicated; they belong to that class of individuals who,
in matters of personal and civil rights, are under the protection
x Halleck, International Law. (Baker's edition), P. 482.
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of the new sovereign, though they are not yet clothed with
political status or the privilege of suffrage. In the absence of
treaty stipulations in regard to national character, the inhabi-
tants of conquered territory are subject to military dominion
and protection, and remain'so subject until the new sovereign
provides a civil government in substitution of the military
authority. In the American system of government the power
to change this condition and situation from military domination
to civil government is resident in Congress. Until this change
is authorized by the appropriate legislative authority, the
President, however, as commander-in-chief of the army, would
be clothed with absolute power in this regard, were not the
lives, liberty and property of the inhabitants guaranteed and
safeguarded by public law, and the municipal law locally in
force. The usual and wise practice is the recognition of the
municipal laws by the military authority and the establish-
ment of a provisional quasi-civil administration until Congress
legislates. The conquered territory while in this transition
state is not a part of the United States within constitutional
and legislative provision and enactment, unless expressly in-
cluded in terms, although in international relations it may be
so treated and considered. In the case of a guano island
the Supreme Court considered it "as appertaining to the
United States."' This is doubtless an anomalous position,
but it is one which appears to follow unavoidably as the re-
sult of peculiar and exceptional conditions. So long as it
continues, much hardship may be entailed upon the in-
nocent inhabitants, which would appeal forcibly for relief to
the legislative power and to executive discretion; but these
considerations do not alter the accidental, provisional status of
the territory or of its native inhabitants. The reason assigned
for this exclusion of the island inhabitants from American
citizenship, appears to be that our Insular possessions have not
yet been admitted into the Vnion, although the territory in which
they reside is presently under the military ]urisdiction and avow-
edly the property of the United States. Under the American
system of civil government, the inhabitants who are citizens
are naturally divided into two general classes: First, all the
1 Jones v. U. S., 137 U. S., p. 202-212.
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inhabitants who are secured by the fundamental law in their
civil, personal and property rights; second, a limited and
privileged class, who are clothed with political franchise and
privileges. The inhabitants of conquered territory are within
the first division, but they are not within the second and
privileged division unless embraced in treaty stipulations, or
until Congress acts and ordains the conditions upon which they
may be admitted to the various grades of citizenship. Judicial
sanction in support of this position may be found in numerous
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. It was
said, in the case of Ramsay v. MurPhy (I 14 U. S. 44), by the
Supreme Court of the United States recently, that: "The people
of the United States, as sovereign owners of the national ter-
ritories, have supreme power over them and their inhabitants.
In the exercise of this sovereign dominion, they are represented
by the Government of the United States, to whom all the
powers of government over that subject have been delegated,
subject only to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitu-
tion, or are necessarily implied in its terms, or in the purposes
and objects of the power itself; for it may well be admitted
in respect to this, as to every power over its members, that
it is not absolute and unlimited." This language in reference
to constitutional restrictions it is to be observed, was used in
the case of a claim to vote by certain inhibited classes in an
organizd civil territorial government, and not the case of in-
habitants of territory under military dominion In the same
case it was said: "The personal and civil rights of the inhabi-
tants of the territories are secured to them, as to other citizens,
by the principles of constitutional liberty which restrain all
the agencies of government, state and national; their political
rights are franchises which they hold as privileges in the
legislative discretion of the Congress of the United States."
In the Dred. Scott case, Ch. J. Taney declared that the citi-
zens of our territories were entitled to all the privileges and
immunities guaranteed by the bill of rights. The attention of
the court, however, was not drawn to any distinction between
provisions for the people of the United States and provisions
for persons generally without reference to their political re-
lations or allegiance. And Simeon E. Baldwin adds: "It is a
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subtle distinction, but I am inclined to think that it is a real
one, which would be found of substantial service should the
Senate ratify the Spanish treaty as it stands."'
In 1853, in a case arising out of the imposition of a war
tariff by military authority at San Francisco, while such occu-
pation continued the same court said:
"The formation of the civil government in California,
when it was done, was the lawful exercise of a belligerent
right over a conquered territory. It was the existing govern-
ment when the territory was ceded to the United States,
as a conquest, and did not cease, as a matter of course,
or as a consequence of the restoration of peace; and was
rightfully continued after peace was made with Mexico, until
Congress legislated otherwise, under its constitutional power
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations re-
specting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States." Cross v. Harrison, 16 Howard, U. S., p. 164.
When the Peace Commissioners at Paris reached a point in
their deliberations when it was determined to provide for the
future status of Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula,
residing in the territory over which Spain relinquished or
ceded her sovereignty, as well as for the native inhabitants,
they formulated their conclusions in Article IX. In its first
clause, it provided for the right of election of national char-
acter by Spanish subjects therein residing, to be exercised
within a year from the ratification of the treaty. The second
clause was in the words following: "The civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Con-
gress." This language is peculiar, and differs from the cor-
responding stipulations in respect to the guarantees extended
to the native inhabitants, found in the treaty for the Louisiana
purchase, the Florida Treaty, and the Joint Resolution for the
annexation of Texas. In the Philippines archipelego the
attitude of the United States is unique. We purchased and
paid Spain for the archipelego; but her sovereignrty had been
long contested, was contested at date of purchase, and she
was not able to deliver the territory and its accompanying
1 " The People of the United States," Yale Law Journal, January, 1899.
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public property, and the United States has been constrained
to insist upon her title by act of war and conquest, which is
not yet complete.
This clause referring the determination of the civil rights
and political status of the native inhabitants to Congress was,
no doubt, inserted in view of the antecedent history of terri-
torial acquisitions by the United States, recent American
history, and with particular reference to racial conditons
existing in these ceded territories. Being a provision in a
treaty ratified by the United States, it is, and until abrogated
by a law of Congress, will remain the supreme law of the
land.
The conclusion is, that so long as the ceded territories
remain under military dominion of the United States, the
President, in the exercise of the belligerent right of conquest,
unless restrained by public law, treaty stipulations or usage,
possesses almost absolute power over the territory and its
inhabitants; and this authority is paramount until Congress
shall legislate in respect thereto. What Congress may do
under constitutional grant or in the exercise of legislative
sovereign power is one thing; what Congress should do in
the contingencies presently arising in our insular possessions
and under the stress of public opinion is quite another matter.
From a political standpoint merely, it is a question of expedi-
ency rather than a question of the extent and character of the
power to be exercised, wherever lodged. Addressed to admin-
istrative party government, it may be a question of policy;
addressed to the moral sentiment of the community, it is a
question of justice, equity, accommodation and fair dealing.
"In case the government of the new State is a constitutional
government of limited and divided powers, questions neces-
sarily arise respecting the authority, which, in the absence of
legislative action, can be exercised in the conquered territory.
after the cessation of war, and the conclusion of a treaty of
peace. The determination of these questions depends upon
the institutions and laws of the new sovereign, which, though
conformable to the general rule of the law of nations, affect
the construction and application of that rule to particular
cases." (Halleck, Int. Law, Baker's ed., p. 482. Amierican
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Institute Co v. Canter, I Peters. 5 11, 541 ; HorMO1 Church V.
U. S., 136 U. S. 42; Jones v. U. S., 137 U. S. 202, 212.)
Many of these are questions to be determined primarily by
the political branch of the government, and its decision will
be followed by the judiciary. The acquisition of new territory
by war or treaty, is political, not judicial. And the ascertain-
ment as a fact, belongs to the executive and legislative depart-
ments and not to the judicial departments.
Alexander Porter Morse.
Vashington, D. C
